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The ever increasing number of motor vehicle accidents on the nation's
highways has made compensation of innocent victims of automobile acci-
dents a significant social problem. Where the tort-feasor is solvent or
adequately insured the innocent victim has recourse for his injury; but
where the tort-feasor is uninsured and financially irresponsible, the innocent
traffic accident victim too often is left without compensation. A large step
toward the solution of this problem was offered by the casualty insurance
industry in December of 1956 in the form of uninsured motorist coverage.
It permits the insured to obtain financial protection under his own automo-
bile policy against the risk of being injured or killed in an automobile acci-
dent with an uninsured motorist.
Other solutions to the uninsured motorist problem have been offered
in the form of motor vehicle financial responsibility laws and compulsory
insurance laws. The first financial responsibility law was enacted in Con-
necticut in 1926.1 Since that time all of the fifty states have adopted some
form of legislation requiring proof of financial responsibility in the opera-
tion of motor vehicles.2 These financial responsibility laws have definitely
brought an increase in the number of insured automobiles on the nation's
highways, yet they do not protect the driving public against the irresponsi-
ble uninsured motorist. These laws generally require proof of future financial
responsibility, but they allow the financially irresponsible motorist the first
accident before the financial responsibility laws apply. No protection is pro-
vided to the first victim of the financially irresponsible motorist.
Laws enacted by Massachusetts in 1925, by New York in 1957, and by
*Member of The Missouri Bar; Assistant General Counsel, MFA Insurance
Companies, Columbia, Missouri.
1. Law of January 1, 1926, ch. 183, [1925J, Conn. Public Acts 3598 (repealed
1927). For a description of the increase in uninsured motorist statutes see Not-
man, A Decennial Study of Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 540 INs. L.J. 22
(1968); Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection
Presently Available and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALO
L. Rsv. 283 (1960).
2. Notman, supra note 1, at 23.
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North Carolina in 1958, have made automobile liability insurance com-
pulsory.3 Such laws have failed, however, as a panacea to the problem of
the financially irresponsible motorist. They afford no protection against the
hit-and-run driver or the non-resident driver. They are also ineffective when
an insurance company disclaims coverage under policy defenses such as
lack of cooperation by the insured.4 Uninsured motorist coverage was
created to remedy these deficiencies in the financial responsibility laws,
compulsory insurance laws, and other legislation.5 The effectiveness and
desirability of uninsured motorist coverage is indicated by the fact that
presently forty-six states, including Missouri,6 have enacted some form of
mandatory uninsured motorist insurance law.
7
3. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34 A-J (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1966),
ch. 175, § 113 A-G (1959), as amended, (Supp. 1966); Law of April 16, 1956, ch.
655, [1956], McKinney's Session Laws of New York 758 (repealed 1959); N.C.
GN. STAT. H8 20-309 to -319 (1965).
4. Notman, A Decennial Study of Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 540
INS. L.J. 22 (1968).
5. Unsatisfied Judgment laws have been enacted in New Jersey, Maryland,
Michigan and North Dakota providing for the payment of unsatisfied judgments
from a special fund established by assessment.
6. § 379.203, RSMo 1959.
1. No automobile liability insurance covering liability arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered
or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle
registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided
therein or supplemental thereto, in not less than the limits for bodily
injury or death set forth in § 303.030, RSMo, for the protection of per-
sons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from
owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury,
sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; provided, how-
ever, that the coverage required under this section shall not be applicable
where any insured named in the policy shall reject the coverage in writing;
and provided further, that unless the insured named in the policy re-
quests such coverage in writing, such coverage need not be provided in or
supplemental to a renewal policy where the named insured had rejected
the coverage in connection with a policy previously issued him by the
same insurers. Provisions affording such insurance protection against unin-
sured motorists issued in this state prior to October 13, 1967, shall, when
afforded by any authorized insurer, be deemed, subject to the limits pre-
scribed in this section, to satisfy the requirements of this section.
2. For the purpose of this coverage, the term "uninsured motor vehicle"
shall, subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage, be deemed
to include an insured motor vehicle where the liability insurer thereof is
unable to make payment with respect to the legal liability of its insured
within the limits specified herein because of insolvency.
3. An insurer's insolvency protection shall be applicable only to accidents
occurring during a policy period in which its insured's uninsured motorist
coverage is in effect where the liability insurer of the tort-feasor becomes
insolvent within two years after such an accident. Nothing herein contained
shall be construed to prevent any insurer from affording insolvency pro-
[Vol. 34
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II. UNINSURED MOTORIST STATUTES
The uninsured motorist statutes seek to compel the acceptance of un-
insured motorist coverage on motor vehicles registered or principally gar-
aged in the state.8 One announced purpose of these statutes is to minimize
losses to the people of the state who are involved in accidents with uninsured
or financially irresponsible motorists.9 Another purpose is to provide protec-
tion against the risk of inadequate compensation by placing the injured
policyholder in the same position as if the tort-feasor had carried automobile
liability coverage with the minimum limits prescribed by the state financial
responsibility law.10 In jurisdictions where uninsured motorist statutes have
been enacted, the terms, definitions, and conditions of the statutes enter
into and become a part of the insurance contract.11 It is important to keep
these purposes in mind when evaluating the construction placed upon these
statutes by the courts in the cases which are discussed below.
The Missouri statute states that no automobile liability insurance policy
"shall be delivered or issued for delivery" without containing uninsured
motorist coverage unless the insured rejects the coverage in writing.'2 Once
rejected, unless the insured requests such coverage in writing, it need not
be provided in renewal policies issued by the same insurer. Policies in force
at the effective date of the statute are not affected until renewed or reis-
sued.13 It has been held that the furnishing of a new declaration page which
tection under terms and conditions more favorable to its insureds than is
provided hereunder.
4. In the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by
this section, and subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage,
the insurer making such payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to
the proceeds of any settlement or judgment resulting from the exercise of
any rights of recovery of such person against any person or organization
legally responsible for the bodily injury for which such payment is made,
including the proceeds recoverable from the assets of the insolvent insurer.
7. For a survey of these statutes see the chart analysis at the end of this
article.
8. For example, see the Missouri statute, note 6 supra.
9. Mission Ins. Co. v. Brown, 63 Cal.2d 508, 47 Cal. Rptr. 363, 407 P.2d
275 (1965).
10. Sterns v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 510 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966);
Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965); Motors
Ins. Corp. v. Surety Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 487, 134 S.E.2d 631 (1964); Peterson v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651 (1964).
11. Stevens v. American Service Mut. Ins. Co., 234 A.2d 305 (D.C. Cir.
1967); Voris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 213 Cal. App.2d 29, 28 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1963).
12. § 379.203, RSMo 1959, note 6 supra.
13. Lee v. Michigan Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 158 S.E.2d 774 (S.C. 1968); Ball v.
California State Auto. Ass'n. Inter-Ins. Bureau, 201 Cal. App.2d 85, 20 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1962). As in all but ten of the other states now having uninsured motorist
1969]
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merely clarifies an existing policy does not amount to a renewal or reissuance
of the policy.14 Where a policy is endorsed, however, to add an additional
vehicle or additional coverage, the endorsement will constitute the issuance
of a policy within the meaning of the statute.15
III. OPERATION OF THE COVERAGE
The insuring agreement found in the 1963 Standard Family Automobile
Liability Policy 1' promises:
To pay all sums which the insured or his legal representatives shall
be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured automobile because of bodily injury, sickness or
disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called
"bodily injury," sustained by the insured, caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured
automobile....
Uninsured motorist coverage is a relatively new subject for judicial in-
terpretation. Cases in this early state of development have not as yet
shown sufficiently clear trends to justify statements of well-settled rules or
principles. 17 Many of the decisions in states having uninsured motorist
statutes are beclouded with statutory interpretations which limit their
applicability in other jurisdictions even to similar fact situations. In view
of this quagmire of conflicting statutory and policy provisions, the courts
have been careful to specifically limit their findings to the particular issues
and facts before them.
A. Protection for the Insured, Not the Uninsured
It is important to recognize that uninsured motorist coverage is not
intended to provide liability insurance for the uninsured motorist. The
insured is protected by the coverage against the risk of inadequate com-
laws, the insured may expressly reject the coverage in writing. Myers v. National
Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ins. Co., 252 Cal. App.2d 599,
60 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1967).
14. Sanders v. National Casualty Co., 157 So.2d 436 (Fla. App. 1963).
15. Gulf American Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App. 286, 154 S.E.2d
411 (1967).
16. For an annotated copy of the 1963 Standard Family Automobile Liability
Policy, see N. RIsJoRD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES,
STANDARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX (1964).
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pensation, but the uninsured motorist is not insured against liability.18
The protection of the uninsured motorist coverage is restricted only to those
persons falling within the policy definition of "insured."'19 In keeping with
the theory that the coverage was not intended to benefit the uninsured
motorist by providing him with free liability insurance, the 1963 Standard
Family Automobile Liability Policy provides in the "trust agreement" sec-
tion that, inter alia, the insured shall take "such action as may be necessary
or appropriate" to recover damages from the tort-feasor, and that the car-
ier shall be reimbursed out of the recovery for its payments and expenses.
The policy thus clearly contemplates that the uninsured motorist may have
to pay something for his negligence.20
B. Damages Recoverable
The sums which the insured or his legal representative may recover
under the uninsured motorist coverage must arise out of bodily injury to
the insured, including resulting sickness, disease, or death. The damages
recoverable by the insured have been held not to include punitive damages. 21
This is consistent with the purpose of the uninsured motorist coverage,
which is simply to provide compensation to the insured for bodily injuries
suffered as a result of an accident with an uninsured motorist. In addition,
the punishment objective of punitive damages would not be served by
permitting the insured to recover under his own insurance coverage, which is
designed to compensate him for his actual injuries.
C. Thte Insured or "His Legal Representative"
Uninsured motorist coverage provides for the payment of all sums
which the "insured or his legal representatives" shall be legally entitled to
recover as damages for "bodily injury" sustained by the insured. The ex-
tent to which an insured can recover damages for bodily injury suffered by
18. Home v. Superior Life Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962);
Hobbs v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 212 F. Supp. 349 (W.D. Va. 1962).
19. Recovery under the coverage has been denied to a workmen's compensa-
tion subrogee in Home v. Superior Life Ins. Co., supra note 19. Recovery has also
been denied to a joint tort-feasor seeking contribution in Hobbs v. Buckeye Union
Cas. Co., supra note 19.
20. For example, if the uninsured motorist is solvent and has assets which
could be recovered by the subrogee insurance company, then he will end up
compensating the insurance company for the payments made under the uninsured
motorist coverage.
21. Hanna v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233 F. Supp. 510 (E.D. S.C.
1964); Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
1969]
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another insured remains unsettled. 22 This problem may arise where the
plaintiff, included in the policy definition of "insured," is seeking recovery
on a derivative claim where the injured party is also an "insured" under the
policy. In Sterns v. M.F.A. Mutual Insurance Cornpany,23 suit was brought
by the parents of a girl killed in an accident involving an uninsured motorist
where both the parents and a daughter were within the definition of insured
in the policy. It was contended that the parents were entitled to recover,
not as the daughter's legal representatives, but as insureds under the policy.
Defendant insurer's demurrer was sustained. A second action was filed
against the defendant insurance carrier, the father asserting that, as adminis-
trator of his daughter's estate, he was her "legal representative" and was
"legally entitled to recover" under the wrongful death statute2 4 from the
uninsured motorist the damages sustained by the parents. After the dis-
missal of this suit by the trial court upon similar motion, the cases were
consolidated for appeal. The Kansas City Court of Appeals was able to
avoid the question of whether the parents could recover as insureds by find-
ing that the parents had a right of recovery as the "legal representatives"
of the insured. The court noted that the term "legal representative" has no
fixed meaning within the law, and that the purposes of uninsured motorist
insurance included indemnification of survivors and dependents of insureds
who suffer bodily injury resulting in death from the negligence of an unin-
sured motorist.
We uphold that purpose by declaring that the term "legal repre-
sentative" used in the policy, as it applies to a person or persons
claiming damages for a wrongful death, includes all persons who
may have the right to bring an action under [the wrongful death
statute], and that its meaning is not restricted to an administrator
or executor. 25
A Florida decision 26 chose the same route in allowing compensation to a
plaintiff who was an "insured" under the policy as well as a "legal repre-
22. Fairgrave and Forney, Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 33 INS. COUNSEL J.,
665 (1966). At least one reported case has denied recovery to one insured for
damages resulting from bodily injury to another. Moore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 108
Ga. App. 60, 131 S.E.2d 834 (1963).
23. 401 S.W.2d 510 (K.C. Mo. App. 1966).
24. § 537.080, RSMo 1959 (Repealed). § 537.080, RSMo 1967 Supp. was
enacted in lieu thereof.
25. Stems v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 401 S.W.2d 510, 519 (K.C. Mo. App.
1966).
26. Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 616 (Fla. Ct. App.
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sentative." The widow of an insured who was killed in an accident with an
uninsured motorist asserted a claim under the wrongful death act. The
court, relying upon the statutory requirement that mandatory uninsured
anotorist coverage included recovery for wrongful death, imposed upon the
insurer the obligation to provide such coverage.27
A strained construction of the term "legal representatives," however,
.should not be necessary to allow wrongful death recoveries under the
Standard Family Policy and similar policies. To maintain an action on the
policy for wrongful death, the plaintiff may establish either that he is the
legal representative of the deceased insured or that he is entitled to re-
cover as an insured under the policy. The definition of "insured" in the
Standard Family Policy includes any person entitled to recover damages
because of bodily injury sustained by ". . . the named insured and any
relative" or "any other person while occupying an insured automobile." This
would include those people with derivative claims for loss of services or
consortium, or with a claim under the wrongful death act.
The Missouri uninsured motorist statute28 was enacted after the deci-
sion in the Sterns case. It requires coverage for "protection of persons in-
jured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness
or disease, including death resulting therefrom. . . ." The policy considered
in the Sterns case did not contain this additional classification of insureds,29
and plaintiff's contention that the parents were "additional insureds" was
not considered by the court.
The courts have generally failed to consider that the cause of action
sued upon under the wrongful death statute is an independent cause of
action created by statute rather than the cause of action surviving to the
administrator or executor as the insured's legal representative30 Recovery
as an insured by the party bringing the wrongful death claim where this
additional classification is found is consistent with the purpose of uninsured
27. A vigorous dissent, finding no ambiguity or inconsistency in the language
of the uninsured motorist coverage, contended that the holding of the majority
constituted a rewriting of the policy. Id. at 618-19.
28. See note 6 supra.
29. Some policy forms including the 1959 Special Automobile Policy limit
recovery by this class of insureds to damages for care and loss of services. See
N. RisjoRD & J. AuSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STANDARD
PROVISIONS AND APPENDIx, 115 (1964).
30. See, e.g., Zeagler v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N. Y., 166 So.2d 616
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motorist coverage. It places the insured or his heirs in the same position as
if the uninsured motorist had been insured, avoids the fiction that insured's
heirs are the insured's legal representatives, and preserves to the adminis-
trator or executor the right without qualification to maintain claims as the
insured's "legal representative" under the survival of action statute31 where
the insured's death did not result from the bodily injuries sustained.
D. Possibility of Midtiple Recoveries
Where it is not definitely established that the insured died as a result
of the injuries sustained in the accident involving an uninsured motorist,
the insurer may be faced with the threat of having to pay more than one
person.32 For example, a wrongful death recovery by a widow may not bar
recovery by the administrator or executor under the survival statute3 3 in
Missouri, even though the claims are inconsistent and adverse. Although
recognizing that the legislature intended only one recovery in this situation,
the Supreme Court of Missouri stated in such a case that it knew of no
principle "by which a judgment in either of the pending damage actions
would bar the other," or by which either party plaintiff "would be estopped
by a verdict or judgment in the other case as to any fact issue litigated in
such other case."3 4 Where such double liability may arise, the insurance com-
pany may obtain releases from both the owner of the wrongful death claim
and the administrator or executor of the estate. If settlement is not desired
or available, it is suggested that the interpleader procedure may be em-
ployed to bind conclusively all of the possible claimants in one adjudica-
tion.85
E. Damages "Legally Entitled" to be Recovered
In an action against the insurer, the insured has the burden of estab-
lishing not only that the other motorist was uninsured, but also that the
other motorist is legally liable to the insured 30 The policy states that only
31. § 537.020, RSMo 1959.
32. See, e.g., Smith v. Preis, 396 S.W.2d 636 (Mo. 1965); Harris v. Groggins,
374 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. En Banc 1963); Donahue v. St. L. Pub. Serv. Co., 374 S.W.2d
79 (Mo. 1963); Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 280 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. En Banc
1955).
33. § 537.020, RSMo 1959.
34. Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, 280 S.W.2d 17, 22-23 (Mo. En Banc 1955),.
quoted in Harris v. Groggins, 374 S.W.2d 6, 14 (Mo. En Banc 1963).
35. See Plaza Express Co. v. Galloway, supra note 35.
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those damages which the insured is "legally entitled" to recover from the
uninsured motorist and which are "caused by accident" may be the subject
of a collectible uninsured motorist claim. In some jurisdictions this will not
mean that the insurance company cannot be sued until the rendition of a
judgment against the actual tort-feasor,3 7 but it may mean that the insured
must actually be able to bring a viable suit against the tortfeasor. Hence,
when an automobile operated by an uninsured motorist struck an automo-
bile in which his wife was riding, it was held that she could not maintain
an action under her uninsured motorist coverage because she would be
precluded from suing her husband by the common law bar to suits by one
spouse against the other.2 8
IV. DEFINITION OF INSURED
The 1963 Standard Family Automobile Liability Policy defines "in-
sured" to mean:
(a) the named insured and any relative;
(b) any other person while occupying an insured automobile; and
(c) any person, with respect to damages he is entitled to recover
because of bodily injury to which this part applies sustained
by an insured under (a) or (b) above.
The definitions of "named insured" and "relative" found in the liability
coverage section of the policy are applicable to the uninsured motorist
coverage. "Relative" as used in the standard policy means a relative of the
named insured who is a resident of the same household.39 An additional
qualification is found in some policies, including the Special Package Auto-
mobile Policy, 40 where "relative" means "a person related to the named
insured by blood, marriage or adoption, who is a resident of the same house-
hold, provided neither such relative nor his spouse owns a private passenger
automobile." This additional restriction has been found to be neither un-
reasonable nor inconsistent with the objectives of the coverage.4 '
37. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., note 37 supra; Writing v. Fidelity
& Cas. Co., 270 N.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 100 (1967). Missouri also held in Basore v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 626 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), that an insured was not
required to obtain a judgment against a hit and run driver in order to establish
her right to recover on the policy.
38. Noland v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Mo. App.
1967).
39. It also includes the spouse of the named insured, residing with him. Basore
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 626 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
40. N. Risjoan & J. AUSTIN, Op. cit. s spra note 16, at 141.
41. Smitke v. Travelers Indem. Co., 264 Minn. 212, 118 N.W.2d 217 (1962);
See also Lopez v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 250 C.A.2d 210, 58 Cal. Rptr.
243 (1967), holding policy definition contrary to California statutory definition.
9
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Cases construing the requirement that the relative be a resident of the
same household have reached a variety of results.42 A married daughter
staying with her parents while her husband attended a university in another
town was found to be a resident of the same household as her insured
husband.43 Also found to be residents of the same household as the named
insured were three individuals on military duty,44 including one stepson of a
New York named insured who was injured as a passenger in a car while
stationed in Hawaii.45
Coverage is also provided by the definition of "insureds" for "any
other person while occupying an insured automobile." "Occupying" as used
in the Standard Family Policy means "in or upon or entering into or alight-
ing from." Where a police officer was struck while walking along the high-
way near his police cruiser, it was held that, since he was 164 feet away
from the police cruiser at the time the injuries were sustained, he was not
"occupying" the insured vehicle at the time of the accident. 6 Similarly,
where the insured was injured while leaning over the engine of a disabled
vehicle when it was struck in the rear by an uninsured motorist, he was
found not to be "upon" an insured vehicle within the meaning of the policy
since "upon" must have some connection with "occupying. ' 47 Since he had
not occupied and did not intend to occupy the disabled vehicle he did not
qualify as an insured under the policy on the disabled vehicle. Some policies,
such as the Special Package Automobile Policy, do not contain a specific
definition of "occupying" under the uninsured motorist coverage. In these
42. Am. Universal Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 62 Wash.2d 595, 384 P.2d 367 (1963);
Balletti v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 814, 228
N.Y.S.2d 768 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Liprie v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 143 So.2d
597 (La. Ct. App. 1962); LaMarch v. Md. Cas. Co., 35 Misc. 2d 641, 231 N.Y.S.2d
121 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Matwijko v. Walter Zoladz Lumber, Builders Supply and
Fuel Corp., 16 App. Div. 2d 1024, 230 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Fidelity and
Cas. Co. v. Jackson, 297 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1962); Zuckerman v. Motor Vehicle
Accident Indem. Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 574, 212 N.Y.S.2d 179 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
43. White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966),
aff'd., White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 245 F. Supp. 1 (W.D. Va. 1965).
44. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jahrling, 16 App. Div. 501, 229 N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); McGuinnen v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 35 Misc. 2d 827,
231 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
45. Appleton v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 361, 228 N.Y.S.2d
442 (1962).
46. Insurance Co. of North America v. Perry, 204 Va. 833, 134 S.E.2d 418(1964). Also rejected was the contention that he was a "legal representative"
of the named insured, the City of Norfolk, Virginia.
47. Pennsylvania National Mut. and Cas. Ins. Co. v. Bristow, 207 Va. 381,
150 S.E.2d 125 (1966).
[Vol 34
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cases reference must be made to the use of the term in other coverages,
such as medical payments.48
The third class of "insureds" under the policy definition are those who
sustain damages as a result of bodily injury to insureds included in either
of the other classes. This broad class would include insureds maintaining
claims of loss of services and consortium, medical expenses, and other deriva-
tive losses. The United States Government was permitted to recover under
this section of the definition when an army officer insured by Government
Employees Insurance Company was injured while traveling in his personal
car.49 It was held that the United States qualified as "a person" entitled to
recovery because of bodily injury to the named insured for medical expenses
pursuant to the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act 5 ° But a collision car-
rier, on the other hand, is not allowed recovery as an insured against an un-
insured motorist carrier even though the insured could have recovered his
property damage from his uninsured motorist carrier instead of his collision
carrier.5 1
V. DEFINrrION OF INSURED AUTOMOBILE
While coveage is afforded the named insured or any relative while a
pedestrian or when occupying other vehicles, the coverage afforded any
other person applies only while such person is occupying an insured auto-
mobile as defined in the policy. An "insured automobile" is defined in the
1963 Standard Family Automobile Policy as: (a) an automobile described
in the policy for which a specific premium charge indicates that coverage
is afforded; (b) a newly acquired automobile; (c) a temporary substitute
automobile; and (d) a non-owned automobile operated by the named in-
sured. The definition includes a trailer being used in connection with the
48. Inter-Ocean Ins. Co. v. Norris, 205 Tenn. 217, 326 S.W.2d 437 (1959);
Green v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 139 W.Va. 475, 80 S.E.2d 424 (1954);
Christoffer v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 123 Cal. App.2d 979, 267 P.2d
887 (1954); Wolf v. Am. Cas. Co., 2 Il. App.2d 124, 188 N.E.2d 777 (1954); Sher-
man v. N.Y. Cas. Co., 78 R.I. 393, 82 A.2d 839 (1951); Young v. State Auto
Ins. Assoc., 72 Pa. D & C 399 (1949); Ross v. Protective Indem. Co., 135 Conn.
150, 62 A.2d 340 (1948); Independence Ins. Co. v. Jeffries, 299 Ky. 680, 172
S.W.2d 566 (1943); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Rust, 169 Tenn. 22, 46 S.W.2d
70 (1932); Reynolds v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 166 S.C. 214, 164 S.E. 602
(1932); Stewart v. N. Am. Accident Ins. Co., 226 Mo. App. 361, 33 S.W.2d 1005
(K.C. Mo. App. 1931); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Wash.
683, 229 P. 585 (1930).
49. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. United States, 376 F.2d 836 (4th Cir.
1967).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2651 (1964).
51. Motors Ins. Co. v. Surety Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 487, 134 S.E.2d 631 (1964).
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automobile. The term "insured automobile" does not include: (a) Any
automobile or trailer owned by a resident of the same household as the in-
sured; (b) Any automobile while used as a public or livery conveyance; (c)
Any automobile while used without the permission of the owner.
An individual owning more than one automobile should carry uninsured
motorist coverage on al automobiles in order to avoid being without this
coverage when operating an owned automobile not covered by a specific
policy. Similarly, if a named insured is operating an automobile owned by
a resident of the same household, the coverage afforded by the named in-
sured's policy would not apply. Since the uninsured motorist coverage is
primarily on a "described automobile" basis, the protection of the coverage
cannot be obtained on all owned vehicles by insuring only one.52
An insured automobile operated by someone other than the owner must
be operated with the owner's permission in order to come within the pro-
tection of the policy.53 The Standard Family Policy provides coverage when
a non-owned automobile is operated by the named insured with the permis-
sion of the owner. Other policies,54 however, may afford coverage to
the named insured, his spouse, and any relative while occupying a non-owned
automobile.
Although a non-owned automobile operated by the named insured with
permission may qualify as an insured automobile, this provision is limited
by the exclusion from the definition of "insured automobile" of any automo-
bile or trailer owned by a resident of the same household as the named in-
sured. This is well illustrated where plaintiff owned a Ford automobile which
was not insured, but was a resident of the same household as Brown, who
carried a family automobile policy insuring her Buick automobile. While
driving his Ford, plaintiff and a passenger were injured in a collision with
an uninsured motorist. In actions brought against Brown's insurer, plaintiff
contended that his Ford was a temporary substitute automobile for Brown's
Buick and that it was, therefore, an insured automobile under Brown's
policy. It was held that, even assuming that his Ford was a temporary sub-
stitute automobile, it could not be an "insured" automobile, since it was
owned by a resident of the same household as the named insured, Brown.55
52. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Akers, 340 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1965).
53. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 203 Va. 600, 125
S.E.2d 840 (1962).
54. For example, see the policy involved in Davidson v. Eastern Fire and Cas.
Ins. Co., 245 S.C. 472, 141 S.E.2d 135 (1965).
55. Spencer v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 723 (La. Ct. App.
1965); Rhodes v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 171 So.2d 727 (La. Ct. App. 1965).
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VI. DEFINITION OF UNINSURED AUTOMOBILE
A. GeneraUy
In the Standard Family Automobile Liability policy, an "uninsured
automobile" is defined to mean:
(a) an automobile or trailer with respect to the ownership, main-
tenance or use of which there is, in at least the amounts spec-
ified by the financial responsibility law . ..no bodily injury
liability bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the
accident with respect to any person or organization legally
responsible for the use of such automobile, or with respect to
which there is a bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy
applicable at the time of the accident but the company writing
the same denies coverage thereunder or
(b) a hit-and-run automobile;
but the term "uninsured automobile" shall not include:
(1) an insured automobile or an automobile furnished for the regu-
lar use of the named insured or a relative,
(2) an automobile or trailer owned or operated by a self-insurer
within the meaning of any motor vehicle financial responsibil-
ity law, motor carrier law or any similar law;
(3) an automobile or trailer owned by the United States of Ameri-
ca, Canada, a state, a political subdivision of any such govern-
ment or an agency of any of the foregoing,
(4) a land motor vehicle or trailer if operated on rails or crawler-
treads or while located for use as a residence or premises and
not as a vehicle, or
(5) a farm-type tractor or equipment designed for use principally
off public roads, except while actually upon public roads.
Four separate types of situations may arise under the definition of an
uninsured automobile. These situations are: (1) no bodily injury liability
bond or insurance policy applicable at the time of the accident; (2) liability
insurance is applicable, but the insurance company writing it denies cover-
age; (3) there is insurance coverage applicable, but the limits are less than
the amounts specified by the financial responsibility law in the state where
the insured automobile is principally garaged; (4) The adverse vehicle is a
hit-and-run automobile. The definition of an uninsured automobile in each
case where the language of the definition was considered has been found
to be clear and unambiguous.56
56. Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966);
Hardin v. Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 261 N.C. 67, 134 S.E.2d 142 (1964); Fed. Ins.
Co. v. Speight, 220 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. S.C. 1963).
13
Cox: Cox: Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
In place of the term "'uninsured automobile" some policies use the
term "uninsured highway vehicle."' 57 Where the adverse vehicle involved in
the accident is other than a conventional private passenger automobile,
reference must be made to the policy language and in some instances to
statute to determine if the coverage applies. For example, where the named
insured was stiuck by an uninsured motorcycle while walking in a cross-
walk, the uninsured motorist carrier contended that the word "automobile"
under the uninsured motorist coverage did not include a motorcycle. The
California statute making uninsured motorist coverage mandatory used
the term "motor vehicle," which was defined to include motorcycles. In
finding coverage, the court held that the insurer must be deemed to have
intended that the word "automobile" in the uninsured motorist coverage
should apply to all motor vehicles which were enumerated in the statute.58
The term "motor vehicle", is not defined in the Missouri uninsured
motorist statute, but is defined elsewhere in the Missouri statutes as "any
self-propelled vehicle not operated exclusively upon tracks, except farm
tractors."59 Protection is required by the Missouri uninsured motorist statute
against "uninsured motor vehicles." Consequently, notwithstanding a policy
reference to the term "uninsured automobile," it is likely that policies afford-
ing uninsured motorist coverage delivered or issued for delivery in Missouri
would apply to the wider range of vehicles included in the statutory defini-
tion of the term "motor vehicle."
B. No Liability Bond or Insurance Policy Applicable
Applicable liability insurance need not specifically cover the adverse
automobile, nor must it necessarily be automobile insurance, in order to
take the adverse vehicle out of the definition of uninsured automobile. In
a case where an employer's general liability policy insured against the neg-
ligent acts of employees while operating an automobile, it was found that
an employee driving an otherwise uninsured car on the business of his
57. This is the term used in the 1966 version of the Standard Family Automo-
bile Liability Policy. N. RisjoRD & J. AusTNi, op. Cit. supra 'note 16, at 290 (1967'
Supp.).
58. Voris v. Pacific Indem. Co., 213 Cal. App.2d 29, 28 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1963).
See also Westerhausen v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Ia. 969, 140 N.W.2d 719 (1966);
Askey v. General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 30 App. Div. 2d 632, 290
N.Y.S.2d 759 (1968); Shipley v. American Standard Ins. Co., 183 Neb. 109,_158
N.W.2d 238 (1968).
59. § 301.010, RSMo 1959.
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employer, was not operating an uninsured vehicle within the definition of
the uninsured motorist coverage. 60
C. DemdW of Coverage
The "denial of coverage" provision was added in 1963 to the definition
of an uninsured automobile in the Standard Family Automobile Policy.
The inclusion of this provision has proved perplexing to both insurance
companies and judges. The meaning of the phrase "denies coverage" was
considered at length in the Missouri case of Seabagk v. Sisk.61 The ques-
tion was whether insolvency of the insurer of the adverse vehicle Consti-
tuted a denial of coverage. The court noted that:
All of the prior cases, still a mere handful in number, which
have undertaken to define, or have turned upon the meaning of, the
words "denies coverage" or the phrase "to deny coverage," have
been reported within the past six years and all have arisen in states
in which public policy theretofore had been formulated and de-
clared in legislative enactments designed to provide compensation
for innocent persons injured by negligent uninsured motorists,
either by making uninsured motorist coverage mandatory in all
automobile liability policies issued in those states ... or by estab-
lishing so-called unsatisfied claim and judgment funds . . . or by
setting up a statutory plan combining the features of the first two
alternatives .... 62
At the time this decision was rendered, the Missouri uninsured motorist
statute had not been enacted. The court noted the distinction made
in a New York case63 between "denial of coverage" and "disclaimer of
liability."
To deny coverage is to take the position that for some reason
or other the policy does not encompass the particular accident...
disclaimer of liability usually arises where there is coverage, but
because of some action on the part of the insured, the company re-
fuses to respond. This refusal could be for lack of cooperation by
the insured, fraud perpetrated by the insured on the company or
serving late notice of the accident, just to mention a few.64
60. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Byrum, 206 Va. 815, 146 S.E.2d 246
(1966).
61. 413 S.W.2d 602 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
62. Id. at 607.
63. Uline v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 28 Misc.2d 1002, 213
N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
64. Id. at 1005, N.Y.S.2d at 874-75.
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The Missouri court in Seabaugh regarded the New York definition "as
accurate and sound," but found that the insolvency of the adverse vehicle
insurance carrier was a breach of contract, not a denial of coverage. The
court noted that the phrase "denies coverage" is not a "linguistic 'Mother
Hubbard' within whose enveloping warmth may be gathered all circum-
stances, conditions and contingencies arising subsequent to an accident
which might prevent an ... (insured) from making full financial recovery
from the tort-feasor." 65
Where the insured is injured in a collision intentionally caused by
the other driver it is arguable that the other driver is uninsured since the
typical liability policy does not afford coverage for injuries which are in-
tentionally caused. In McCarthy v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification
Corporation,"0 it was held, however, that the other car was not an uninsured
vehicle. The court distinguished a finding that the insurance company is
not liable "because the injuries were not caused by accident" from a
finding that the company is not liable because the policy was not in force
at the time in question or because there had been a breach of condition
of the policy by the insured.
Automobiles on which liability coverage existed at the time of the
accident have been found to be uninsured automobiles within the mean-
ing of the policy definition or applicable statutory definition in cases where
the carrier has denied liability on the ground that the vehicle was being
operated by a non-permissive user,07 or on the ground of the non-cooperation
of the insured. 8
Recovery has been allowed where the named insured was a passenger
in his own automobile when the driver collided with another automobile. 69
The uninsured driver was held to be operating an "uninsured motor vehicle"
within the meaning of the insured's policy, since the bodily injury liability
65. Seabaugh v. Sisk, 413 S.W.2d 602, 609 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
66. 16 App. Div.2d 35, 224 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1962), aff'd. 12 N.Y.2d 922 (1963).
See also Doe v. Faulkner, 203 Va. 522, 125 S.E.2d 169 (1962).
67. Carlos v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 24 App. Div.2d 747, 263
N.Y.S.2d 670, rev'd on other grounds, 17 N.Y.2d 614, 268 N.Y.S.2d 930, 216 N.E.2d
26 (1966); Buck v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 265 N.C. 285, 144 S.E.2d 34(1965).
68. McDaniel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 815, 139 S.E.2d
806 (1965); Rosen v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 23 App. Div.2d 335, 260
N.Y.S.2d 677 (1965); Berman v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 11 Misc.2d 291, 171
N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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coverage did not afford coverage for the driver with respect to the injury
to the insured. Similarly, a passenger who was an insured under his father's
uninsured motorist coverage was allowed recovery under the father's unin-
sured motorist coverage since his father's liability policy did not afford
coverage for injury to guests in the insured vehicle. 70
D. Insolvency of the Liability Carrier
A problem arises with the subsequent insolvency of the liability
insurer on the adverse vehicle. The question of whether insolvency makes
the adverse vehicle an uninsured automobile within the policy definition
requiring "no applicable insurance," or whether insolvency is a denial of
coverage has been widely considered and with varied results. This frequent
source of litigation has largely been eliminated by the extensions of cover-
age filed in most states by companies and filing bureaus, providing for
coverage for injuries caused by motorists whose insurance company is
or becomes insolvent. Also, many states, including Missouri, have enacted
provisions for insolvency. The Missouri statute provides that the term
"uninsured motor vehicle" shall be deemed to include an insured automobile
when the liability insurer is "unable to make payment with respect to
the legal liability of its insured within the limits specified herein because
of insolvency." 71 Prior to the enactment of this statute, Missouri courts
had twice rejected the argument that the insurer's insolvency creates an
uninsured status.
The policy in one case 72 defined an uninsured automobile as one on
"which there is no bodily injury liability insurance applicable at the time
of the accident." The liability carrier on the adverse vehicle became in-
solvent after the accident. A claim was made by the insured under the
uninsured motorist coverage of her own policy. The court found that the
definition was plainly susceptible of only one meaning: that even though
the insurer subsequently became insolvent, the insured was not involved
in an accident with an uninsured automobile as defined in the policy. In
Seabaugl. v. Sisk,73 the policy defined an uninsured automobile as one
having "no bodily injury liability bond or insurance policy applicable at
the time of the accident." This policy definition was referred to by the
70. Whitney v. American Fidelity Co., 350 Mass. 542, 215 N.E.2d 767 (1966).
71. § 379.203, RSMo 1959. The statute provides that the insolvency must
occur within two years after the accident.
72. Swaringin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 131 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
73. Seabaugh v. Sisk, 413 S.W.2d 602 (Spr. Mo. App. 1967).
1969]
17
Cox: Cox: Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
court as "the no policy definition." Another definition considered by the
court comprehended a situation where an "insurance policy [is] applicable
at the time of the accident, but the company writing the same denies
coverage thereunder." This was referred to by the court as the "denial
of coverage definition." The court found that the adverse vehicle was
not an uninsured automobile under either the "no policy definition" or
the "denial of coverage" definition, holding that the failure of the insolvent
insurance company to defend the adverse driver was a breach of the con-
tract rather than a denial of liability.74
E. Liability Limits Less than Required by State Law
In 1963, the definition of "uninsured automobile" in the Standard
Family Policy was amended to include an automobile which is insured,
but which has liability limits less than the amount specified by the financial
responsibility law of the state in which the insured automobile is principally
garaged. But even in cases where this broader definition has not been
expressly added to the policy upon which suit is brought, jurisdictions hav-
ing mandatory uninsured motorist laws tend to reach the same result.
For example, the wife of a named insured was injured in a California
collision with an automobile operated by a Texas resident having liability
insurance with limits of $5,000 for each person. The minimum limits re-
quired under California law were $10,000 for each person. The California
court allowed the wife of the named insured to recover, finding that the
legislative intent was to give protection in accord with the limits of the
California financial responsibility statute.7 5 Similarly, an automobile that
did not have the minimum limits prescribed by New Hampshire law was
held to be an uninsured automobile to the extent that the insurance on
the adverse vehicle fell short of the statutory limit.' On the other hand,
where the insured recovers the maximum limits under the tort-feasor's
liability policy and then attempts to recover under his own uninsured
74. It is interesting to note that the court cited Pattani v. Keystone Insurance
Co., 209 Pa. Super. 15, 223 A.2d 899 (1966), which was later reversed, 426 Pa.
332, 231 A.2d 402 (1967).
75. Taylor v. Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co., 225 Cal. App.2d 80, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 63 (1964); accord, Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Cal.
App.2d 407 (1967).
76. Carrignan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 108 N.H. 131, 229 A.2d 179 (1967); Stevens
v. Allied Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 234 A.2d 305 (N.H. 1968); Mich. Mut. Liab. Co. v.
Pokerwinski, 8 Mich. App. 475, 154 N.W.2d 609 (1967); McCaffery v. St. Paul
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 N.H. 373, 236 A.2d 490 (1967).
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motorist coverage in addition, his complaint will be summarily dismissed
if the tort-feasor's liability coverage is in the amounts required by the
applicable financial responsibility law.77
The burden of proving that the other motorist in the accident was
uninsured within the' policy definition rests with the insured seeking the
protection of the uninsured motorist coverage. 78 Establishment of this
uninsured status is essential for recovery, 9 but the proper methods of dis-
charging this burden are far from clear.S0 A showing that the insurer's
adjuster had attempted and was unable to ascertain that coverage existed
at the time of the accident, but that the company learned that the policy
of the other driver had been cancelled before the accident, was held in
one case to be sufficient.8 Plaintiffs in other cases, however, have not
fared as well.82 For example, it has been held that failure by an insurer
to defend an action against an adverse driver does not create a presumption
that the adverse driver was uninsuredPs
F. Hit-and-R'z Automobiles
The fourth uninsured automobile" situation is the hit-and-run vehicle
which is defined in the Standard Family Policy to mean:
An automobile which causes bodily injury to an insured arising
out of physical contact of such automobile with the insured or with
an automobile which the insured is occupying at the time of the
accident, provided: (a) there cannot be ascertained the identity
of either the operator or the owner of such 'hit-and-run automo-
bile'; (b) the insured or someone on his behalf shall have reported
the accident within twenty-four hours to a police, peace or judicial
officer or to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, and shall have
filed with the company within 30 days thereafter a statement under
77. Detrick v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 158 N.W.2d 99 (Iowa 1967).
78. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App.
1963); Levy v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Ill. App.2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961).
79. Green v. U.S. Fidelity v. Guaranty Co., 181 So.2d 198 (Fla. Ct. App.
1965).
80. Notman, A Decennial Study of Uninsured Motorist Endorsements, 540
INS. L.J. 22 (1968).
81. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App.
1963).
82. Pan Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Loyd, 411 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Ct. App. 1967);
See also Application of Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 28 Misc.2d 492,'214
N.Y.S.2d 600 (1961).
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oath that the insured or his legal representative has a cause or
causes of action arising out of such accident for damages against a
person or persons whose identity is unascertainable, and setting
forth the facts in support thereof; and (c) at the company's re-
quest, the insured or his legal representative makes available for
inspection the automobile which the insured was occupying at the
time of the accident.
1. Physical Contact Requirement
The physical contact requirement in the definition, intended to avoid
false and fraudulent claims, has been strictly applied.8 4 Pedestrians injured
by automobiles knocked into them by hit-and-run vehicles, 5 and an in-
sured who was forced to strike a parked vehicle by an unknown and
unidentified driver,88 were unable to maintain uninsured motorist claims
since there were no physical contacts with the hit-and-run motorists caus-
ing the accidents.
These results in earlier cases have given way to a more liberal inter-
pretation of the physical contact requirement, particularly where the exist-
ence of the accident-causing vehicle can be established or where a statute
dispensing with physical contact is involved.87 For example, a transmission
of physical force, rather than actual contact, between the hit-and-run
vehicle and the insured vehicle may be sufficient.88 Where an insured col-
lided with an automobile which had been struck and knocked into the path
of his automobile by a hit-and-run vehicle, the court said that the physical
contact requirement designed to prevent false claims should not be ex-
tended to defeat coverage in cases where fraud does not exist 8 9 This
approach is desirable as long as there is substantial evidence of the exist-
ence and culpability of the hit-and-run motorist.
84. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Loring, 91 Ill. App.2d 342, 235 N.E.2d
418 (1968); Cokes v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 151 S.C. -, 161 S.E.2d 175 (1968).
85. Petition of Portman, 33 Misc.2d 385, 225 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Bellavia v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 28 Misc.2d 420, 211 N.Y.S.2d
356 (1961).
86. Prosk v. Allstate Ins. Co., 82 Ill. App.2d 457, 226 N.E.2d 498 (1967).
87. Pulliam v. Doe, 246 S.C. 106, 142 S.E.2d 861 (1965); Costa v. St. Paul
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 228 Cal. App.2d 651, 39 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1964).
88. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp. v. Eisenberg, 18 N.Y.2d 1, 271
N.Y.S.2d 641, 218 N.E.2d 524 (1966); Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 70 Wash.2d 587, 424 P.2d 648 (1967).
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2. Inability to Ascertain Identity of Owner or Operator
of Hit-and-Run Vehicle
The automobile of the insured plaintiff in one case was struck from
the rear by another motorist while she was stopped for a traffic light.
Noticing that the driver of the other car was behaving in "an erratic
and provocative manner," she was afraid to get out of her automobile.
Plaintiff proceeded forward when the traffic light changed, being followed
for several blocks by the threatening motorist. It was argued by defendant
insurance company that she could have ascertained the identity of the
owner or operator and, therefore, she was not entitled to uninsured mo-
torist coverage on the basis of being struck by a hit-and-run driver.
Nevertheless, plaintiff was permitted to recover on the theory that she
was not required to ascertain the other driver's identity at the risk of her
own physical safety.9°
What if an insured could ascertain the identity of the other driver
in a collision, but fails to do so, honestly thinking that no bodily injury
had been sustained? It has been held that such an insured, who later
finds that bodily injuries have been sustained, is not barred from claiming
coverage. 9' Another case allowed recovery where an insured pedestrian
was taken to the hospital by the motorist who had struck him, but was
given a false name and address by the driver 2 These cases suggest that
it is not necessary that the adverse driver actually "run." The only re-
quirement is that the identity of the operator or the owner of the adverse
vehicle cannot reasonably be ascertained.
3. Need for Judgment Against the Hit-and-Run Driver
The hit-and-run situation presents a definite problem to the insured
in states requiring that, as a condition precedent to maintain a suit against
the insurer under the uninsured motorist coverage, a judgment for damages
be obtained against the adverse driver. Virginia93 and South Carolina 4
90. Walsh v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 91 Ill. App.2d 156, 234 N.E.2d
394 (1968).
91. Riemenscheider v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 47 Misc.2d 549,
262 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div.2d 309, 274 N.Y.S.2d 71(1966); Mangus v. Doe, 203 Va. 518, 125 S.E.2d 166 (1962).
92. Darby v. Motor Vehicle Accident Indem. Corp., 52 Misc.2d 1045, 277
N.Y.S.2d 302 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
93. Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-381(e) (Cum. Supp. 1964).
94. S.C. CODE § 46-750, 31-39 (1963).
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have provided for actions against a John Doe- hit-and-run motorist.
Missouri, on the other hand, is one of the jurisdictions which allow suit
to be brought directly against the insurance carrier without obtaining a
separate judgment.05 States which have yet to decide the issue may also
be persuaded to allow a direct action against the insurer where the ad-
verse driver's identity is unascertained. Even though a judgment may be
required when the adverse driver is ascertained, it would seem more prac-
tical, when the adverse driver is unascertained, to allow proof of the legal
liability of the hit-and-run driver in the same action by which recovery
from the insurer is sought.
4. Limitation of Damages
Should an insured's recovery for bodily injury be limited to the injury
sustained by the actual physical contact with the hit-and-run vehicle or
should it also include the injuries sustained as a direct and proximate result
of the contact? In a Missouri case96 where this question arose, the Kansas
City Court of Appeals stated that:
[the policy] does not say that the insured's recovery is limited to
that personal injury occurring at the exact moment of the collision
and that it does not also include injury occurring thereafter as the
direct and proximate result of such collision. As we view it, personal
injuries that are the direct and proximate result of the collision
arise out of the use of the automobile and are caused by the acci-
dent. 7
VII. EXCLUSIONS
The coverage afforded by the Standard Family Automobile Liability
Policy does not apply:
(a) to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
(other than an insured automobile) owned by the named in-
sured or a relative, or through being struck by such an automo-
bile;
(b) to bodily injury to an insured with respect to which such in-
sured, his legal representative or any person entitled to pay-
95. Suit may be brought directly in Missouri regardless of whether the tort-
feasor is unascertained or simply uninsured. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963); Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d
626 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
96. Basore v. Allstate Ins. Co., note 96 supra.
97. Id. at 630.
VoI-34
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/8
UNINSURED- MOTORIST COVERAGE
ment under this coverage shall, without written consent of the
company make any settlement with any person or organiza-
tion who may be legally liable therefor;
(c) so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any
workmen's compensation or disability benefits carrier or any
person or organization qualifying as a self-insurer under any
workmen's compensation or disability benefits law or any
similar law.
Some policy forms contain a combined settlement and judgment pro-
hibition excluding coverage for bodily injury to an insured if the insured
"'shall, without written consent of the company, make any settlement
-with or prosecute to judgment any action against any person or organization
-who might be legally liable therefor." s The provision excluding coverage
where the insured, without the written consent of the insurance company,
obtains a judgment against the adverse driver has been taken out of the
Standard Family Automobile Policy, and it now provides instead that a
judgment obtained in an action brought by the insured without the written
consent of the company shall not be conclusive on the issues of liability
and damages between the insured and the company.99
In Missouri, the "consent" exclusion as a bar to suit was struck
down in 1963 along with the arbitration clause in a holding that it is
against public policy "to permit a prohibition against resort to the courts
for remedy without the consent of the person ultimately liable."' 10 In
a subsequent case, the Springfield Court of Appeals agreed that the judg-
ment prohibition was invalid and unenforceable in Missouri, but found
that the settlement prohibition was valid and that the prohibitions con-
tained in the single exclusion were separable.1' 1 The court stated that
although the judgment prohibition does tend to oust the jurisdiction of
the courts, "it is just as clear" that the settlement prohibition does not.102
98. N. RisjoRD & J. AUSTIN, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE CASES, STAND-
ARD PROVISIONS AND APPENDIX, at 71.
99. No judgment against any person or organization alleged to be legally
responsible for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as between the insured and
the company, of the issues of liability of such person or organization or of the
amount of damages to which the insured is legally entitled unless such judgment
is entered pursuant to an action prosecuted by the insured with the written con-
sent of the company. N. RisjoRD & J. AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 199.
100. State ex rel. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W2d 343, 346
(Spr. Mo. App. 1963).
101. Kisling v. M.F.A. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966). This
case is noted in Williams, Uninsured Motorist I-nsurance-Subrogation--Settlement
With. Tortfeasor, 32 Mo. L. REV. 159 (1967).
102. Kisling v. M.FA. Ins. Co., supra note 102, at 251.
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But the court added the caveat that the insurer's response to an insured's
request for written consent to a proposed settlement will be subject to
judicial scrutiny to insure that a withholding of consent is not arbitrary
or unreasonable.10 3 In view of an additional statement by the court that
"we express no opinion and intend no holding except as applied to the
specific situation before us,"' 04 and in view also of the fact that a contrary
result was reached by the Kansas City Court of Appeals where a settle-
ment had been made with an insured joint tort-feasor, 15 the validity of
the settlement prohibition in Missouri is still unsettled. The new Missouri
statute making uninsured motorist protection compulsory unless expressly
rejected also provides simply that the insurer shall be entitled to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment obtained by the insured person or
organization legally responsible for the injury.10
The settlement prohibition in the standard policy, like the judgment
prohibition, is intended to protect the insurance company's right of subro-
gation created by the "Trust Agreement" section. This section permits
recovery by the insurer "from any person or organization legally responsible
for the bodily injury" sustained by the insured for which the insurer
has made payment. If the insured is free to make a settlement by release
or covenant with the uninsured motorist, the company's rights under the
trust agreement section may be lost. To deny the insurance company its
recovery from the person or persons responsible for the insured's injuries
would in effect make it the liability insurer of the uninsured motorist, which
103. Id. at 251-252.
104. Ibid.
105. Gattenby v. Allstate Ins. Co., K.C. Mo. App. No. 24,617, filed April 3,
1967 (not officially reported). The case was transferred to the Missouri Supreme
Court, but was settled before the court was able to consider it. The Kansas City
Court of Appeals in Gattenby noted that the attack on the settlement exclusion
was much broader than the attack in the Kisling case and concluded:
that the public policy in Missouri, as well as of other states which have
considered this question, is that contracts which attempt to prohibit a
party from settling his claim against a third party, without first obtaining
the consent of the other party to the contract, are void ... It follows that
the contract provision contained in Paragraph 2 of the exclusions and the
party here in issue is void and unenforceable as against our public policy.
We specifically point out that what we have said herein is not necessarily
applicable to a situation where a plaintiff attempts to settle his claim
against the uninsured motorist and thereby binds the insurance company
issuing the policy providing the uninsured motorist coverage. That situa-
tion is not presented for our decision in this case and we expressly refrain
from any holding or statement concerning any such problem.
106. § 379.203, RSMo 1967 Supp.
[Vol. 34
24
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/8
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
is contrary to the purpose of the coverage. In a recent Florida case,'07
the insurer contended that the insured's settlement with the insurer of
the employer of an uninsured motorist was a violation of a policy ex-
clusion containing both the settlement and judgment prohibitions. The
court, in upholding the validity of the settlement prohibition, stated:
[I]t is clear that the defendant breached the exclusion clause of
their uninsured motorist coverage. Such a breach would be presumed
to have prejudiced the insurer and in the absence of an allegation by
the defendant that no prejudice has in fact resulted, defendant
may not recover.108
Neither the settlement prohibition nor the judgment prohibition accords
to an insurer the right to reject or ignore an insured's request for written
consent to a proposed settlement or suit. For example, where the insurance
company has received notice of the insured's suit against the tort-feasor,
but does not acknowledge that fact, it cannot later attempt to avoid cov-
erage by contending that it has not given its written consent to the
prosecution to judgment. 0 9
VIII. REDUCTION OF LIABILITY-RECEIPT OF OTHER BENEFITS
The "Limits of Liability" section of the Standard Family Auto-
mobile Policy provides that payments under the uninsured motorist
coverage are reduced by: (1) all sums paid by or on behalf of the owner
or operator of the uninsured automobile and any other person or or-
ganization jointly or severally liable with such owner or operator; (2)
the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable under
any workmen's compensation law, disability benefit law, or other similar
law; and (3) payments made under the bodily injury coverage of the
same policy. In addition, the company is not obligated to pay damages
paid or payable under the medical payments coverage. It has been sug-
gested that the insured has no choice in deciding whether to make a
claim under the uninsured motorist coverage in lieu of a claim for work-
men's compensation or disability benefits, and that he must seek any
107. Mclnnis v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 68 Auto. Ins. Cases 5814 (Fla.
1968).
108. Id. at 5814.
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payments available under the latter. 10 The workmen's compensation car-
rier usually is subrogated to the insured's cause of action against the
uninsured motorist, but the carrier has not been allowed to recover as
subrogee under the uninsured motorist coverage."' The result of this is
that the workmen's compensation carrier or the disability insurance car-
rier is left with little or no chance of recovering anything. But again,
the purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is not to provide a subrogation
fund for other carriers.
The limits of liability section of the Standard Family Automobile
Policy states that the limits of coverage stated in the declarations for
"each person" and "each accident" are the total limits of the company's
liability for all damages. This includes damages for care or loss of serv-
ices because of bodily injury sustained as a result of any one accident.1"
The hapless insured in one case was hit almost simultaneously by two
uninsured motorists. The insured contended that two accidents had
occurred, and therefore claimed double the amount of the "each acci-
dent" limit of liability stated in the policy. It was held that only one,
accident had occurred and that the insured's claim could not exceed
the limit of liability stated in the declarations." 3
110.
Since the contract of insurance itself states that the policy does not apply
"so as to inure directly or indirectly to the benefit of any workmen's com-
pensation or disability benefits carrier," it would appear that the injured
party has no choice. If a claim were made under an uninsured motorist
coverage in lieu of making a claim for compensation, it is clear that such
a, recovery would inure to the benefit of the workmen's compensation car-
rier indirectly in the sense that -payment from the uninsured motorist.
source would reduce or extinguish any workmen's compensation or dis-
ability benefits liability. Therefore, if there is a possible claim either under
workmen's compensation or disability benefits, whether such claim is as-
serted or not, the value of such claim must be taken into account in re-
ducing the amount of recovery, if any, to which the injured person is en-
titled under the Uninsured Motorist Coverage. The value thus computed
must take into account not only the workmen's compensation or other
payments which have become due but also the present value of all future
payments should they be, involved.
34 INS. COUNSEL J. 74 (1967).
111. Horne v. Superior Life -Ins. Co., 203 Va. 282, 123 S.E.2d 401 (1962). Case
questioned at 284 F. Supp. 1022.
112. Hilton v. Citizens Ins. Co. of NJ., 201 So. 2d 904 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967),
Limit of liability stated in declaration held to be limit for all damages including
husband's claim for derivative damages resulting from bodily injury to wife;
Safeco Ins. Co. v. McManemy, 432 P.2d 537 (Wash. 1967), Limit of $25,000
stated in single limits policy applicable and not financial responsibility limits of
$10,000/$20,000.
113. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewry, 316 F.2d 716, 191 F. Supp. 852
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. The provision reducing recovery under the uninsured motorist cov-
erage by the amount paid and the present value of all amounts payable
under any workmen's compensition law has been the subject of conflict-
ing decisions in the courts. Some states have allowed a setoff.114 Others
in recent cases have found that the state uninsured motorist laws,
seeking to place the insured in the same position as he would have
been if the tort-feasor had had liability insurance, contemplate that the
uninsured motorist coverage is to be available in addition to any bene-
fits that may be received under workmen's compensation. 115 In one
case a street sweeper was struck by an uninsured motorist while in the
scope of his employment. Recovery was allowed under his uninsured
motorist coverage in addition to over $5,000 of workmen's compensa-
tion benefits he had already received, the court holding that the workmen's
compensation setoff provision of the policy was invalid because it dimin-
ished the protection that the uninsured motorist statute required the
insurer to provide.'"
The limits of liability provision dealing with medical payments cov-
erage would allow the insured to recover the limit of liability under
each coverage if his medical expenses exceed the limit of liability of
the medical payments coverage and if his remaining medical expenses
and other damages total or exceed the limit of liability under the'
uninsured motorist coverage. For example, an insured having coverage
limits of $1,000 under the medical payments coverage and $10,000 under
the uninsured motorist coverage would be entitled to recover a total
of $11,000 if his medical expenses exceeded $1,000 and other damages
were more than $10,000.
The conflict found in the decisions regarding setoffs can be at-
tributed to differences in policy provisions and the varying interpretations
of state uninsured motorist laws. Florida courts have considered several
cases in this area. They 'have disallowed some setoffs due to the ab-
sence of a setoff provision," 7 but have allowed the medical payment
114. Niekamp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 52 Ill. App.2d 364, 202 N.E.2d 126 (1964);
Jarrett v. Allstate Ins. Co., 209 Cal. App.2d 804, 26 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1962); Jones v.
Morrison, 287 F. Supp. 1016 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
115. Southeast Title & Ins. Co. v. Austin, 202 So.2d 179 (Fla. 1967); Mason v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 189 So. 2d 907 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Standard Accident Ins. Co.
v. Gavin, 184 So.2d 229 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966); Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 238 Ore. 106, 393 P.2d 651 (1964).
116. Peterson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 115.
117. Hack v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 175 So.2d 594 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Sims v.
National Cas. Co., 171 So.2d 399 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
1969]
27
Cox: Cox: Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1969
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
setoff in others.118 A contrary result was reached where the policy pro-
vided in language similar to the Standard Family Automobile Policy
that "the company shall not be obligated to pay . . . that part of the
damages which the insured may be entitled to recover from the owner
or operator of an insured automobile which represents expenses for med-
ical services paid or payable under the Medical Payments Coverage of
the policy."" 09 The court disallowed the setoff, adopting a public policy
argument that the medical payments setoff provision reduces the minimum
coverage required by statute.
Different language dealing with the setoff of medical payments
was considered in a Louisiana caseU ° where the policy provision reduced
losses payable under the uninsured motorist coverage by "all sums paid
on account of such bodily injury under Coverage C (Medical Payments)
. . .of this policy." It was stipulated that the damages suffered by the
five passengers in the uninsured automobile exceeded the per accident
policy limits of $10,000 and that each had medical expenses exceeding
the medical payments limit of $500. The insurer had paid the $10,000
limit under the uninsured motorist coverage, and the issue was whether
the policy should be construed to award the five plaintiffs $2,500 under
the medical payments coverage in addition. It was held that the insurer
had clearly and unambiguously limited its liability, and that the policy
provisions were not contrary to statute or public policy.' 2 '
IX. THE "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSE
A. Existence of Other Insurance Coverage Available to the Insured
It often occurs, particularly in states where the uninsured motorist
coverage is mandatory, that more than one policy affording this coverage
is applicable in a particular accident. This is true where, for example,
the driver and the passenger in a car struck by an uninsured motorist
both have policies carrying an uninsured motorist endorsement. The first
118. Damsel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 So.2d 825 (Fla. Ct. App.
1966).
119. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Kincaid, 199 So.2d 770, 771 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Carrico, 200 So.2d 265 (Fla. Ct. App.
1967).
120. Morgan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 195 So.2d 648 (La. Ct. App.
1967).
121. The medical payments setoff was also held not contrary to law, public
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part of the "other insurance" clause found in the Standard Family
Automobile Liability Policy 122 applies where the insured is occupying
an automobile not owned by the named insured. It states that in this
situation the coverage shall be the excess above any other coverage
available to the insured. It further provides that this excess applies
only to the extent that its limits exceed the limits of he other unin-
sured motorist coverage. In other words, where A is the driver of his
own car, and B is his passenger, B's coverage under his own policy
(with a $15,000 limit) is in addition to the coverage available to him
under A's policy (with a $10,000 limit), but only to the extent that
the limits of his own policy exceed those of A's policy. Therefore, the net
coverage afforded B under his own policy in this situation is only $5,000.
The second portion of the clause provides that except as to acci-
dents involving an insured occupying an automobile not owned by the
named insured, the uninsured motorist coverage prorates with other ap-
plicable coverage up to the higher of all applicable limits. This means
that A's recovery under his own policy (with a $10,000 limit) will prorate
with the coverage available to him under another applicable policy (with a
$15,000 limit), up to the sum of the limits of both policies ($25,000).
Therefore, if A suffers damages amounting to $15,000 or more, the coverage
available to A under his own policy is $6,000, or two-fifths of his damages
which are deemed not to exceed the higher limit ($15,000).
A majority of cases have given full force and effect to the other
insurance clause. They have limited the insured's recovery to an amount
represented by the highest limit of all applicable policies. Other courts
have found that the other insurance clause is void because of its
122.
With respect to bodily injury to an insured while occupying an automobile
not owned by the named insured, the insurance under Part IV shall apply
only as excess insurance over any other similar insurance available to
such insured and applicable to such automobile as primary insurance, and
this insurance shall then apply only in the amount by which the limit of
liability for this coverage exceeds the applicable limit of liability of such
other insurance. Except as provided in the foregoing paragraph, if the
insured has other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the
accident, the damages shall be deemed not to exceed the higher of the
applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such other insurance,
and the company shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss to
which this Coverage applies than the limit of liability hereunder bears to
the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such
other, insurance.
N. Risjoan & J. AUsTIN, op. cit. sutpra note 98, at 205.
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repugnance to statute. 23 These cases have allowed a stacking or pyra-
miding of coverages, producing a combined recovery much greater than
the insured would have realized had the uninsured motorist been insured
with the minimum limits prescribed by the financial responsibility law.
Decisions of federal courts in Florida and Virginia rejecting the
argument that different coverages may be combined or stacked were
subsequently nullified by contrary state decisions. In Trauelers Indem-
nity Company vs. Wells,'-4 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit rejected an attempt to stack $15,000/$30,000 limits on
two policies to yield $30,000/$60,000 limits on recovery. Since the lim-
its in the two policies were exactly the same, and each met the statutory
requirement, the court found that no excess was involved and stated
that "the provision is too inexplicit to give footing for stretching the
uninsured endorsement beyond its terms."'1 25 Following the Wells case,
the Virginia Supreme Court expressly rejected the holding of Wells.28
The insured had been driving a truck owned by his father when he was
struck and injured by an uninsured motorist against whom he obtained a
judgment for $85,000. Payment was made to the policy limits of $10,000/
$20,000 under the policy on the father's truck. He then brought suit on
his own policy. The other insurance clause was held to be void, since
the policy issued to him undertook to pay all sums which he should be
legally entitled to recover as damages. To hold that the insured could
not recover because he had received part of the sum he is "legally en-
titled to recover" from the uninsured motorist "is to amend the statute,
not to construe it,"-1 said the court.
A similar reversal of a federal court interpretation of an uninsured
motorist statute occurred in Florida.128 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit also rejected an attempt to stack cover-
ages, stating that Florida's policy in providing for the coverage "was
123. Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 270 N.C. 532, 155 S.E.2d 128 (1967);
Smith v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 240 Ore. 167, 400 P.2d 512 (1965); Harleys-
ville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Blumling, 429 Pa. 389, 241 A.2d 112 (1968). See also Childers
v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 282 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Ark. 1968).
124. 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963).
125. Id. at 774.
126. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 205 Va. 897, 140 S.E.2d 817
(1965). See also White v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 361 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1966).
127. Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., snpra note 126, at 902, S.E.2d
at 820.
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to afford the public generally with the same protection that it would
have had if the uninsured motorist had carried the minimum of $10,000/
$20,000 limits as public liability coverage."' 29 Then the Florida Supreme
Court in a subsequent case stated that the Florida uninsured motorist
statute operates to invalidate the other insurance clauses. 30
The majority of jurisdictions, however, have given effect to and have
upheld the other insurance clause,' 3 ' viewing the clause as clearly spec-
ifying the amount of coverage intended to be extended where more than
one policy is applicable. For example, in an Iowa case13 2 where the insured
was "occupying a non-owned automobile" at the time of the accident,
the court stated:
To disregard the provisions of both policies and allow plaintiff to
collect to the extent of the policy limit of each policy, as asked by
the plaintiff, is ... absurd in the face of positive policy limita-
tions .... It is clear that the companies intended to sell less cover-
age and the insureds [to] buy less coverage when occupying an
automobile not owned by the named insured. 33
A third approach is represented by a construction of the other
insurance clause where B had been a passenger in an automobile operated
by A that collided with an uninsured motorist. 3 4 B received $3,000 of
the $5,000 limit from A's ifisurer in a distribution made by the court.
B then sued his own carrier on a policy with the same limits as A's
policy. It was held that the purpose of the uninsured motorist statute
was "to give the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured
motorist as he would have had if he had been injured in an accident
129. Id. at 421.
130. Sellers v. United States Fidelity Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1966), quashing
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sellers, 179 So.2d 608 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
131. Goodbody & Company v. Penjaska, 8 Mich. App. 64, 153 N.W.2d 665(1967); Tindall v. Farmers Auto. Management Corp., 83 Ill. App.2d 165, 226
N.E.2d 397 (1967); Darrah v. Cal. State Auto. Assn., 259 Cal. App.2d 245, 66
Cal. Rptr. 374 (1968); Russell v. Paulson, 18 Utah 2d 157, 417 P.2d 658 (1966);
Phoenix Assur. Co. v. Larsen, 240 Cal. App.2d 94, 50 Cal. Rptr. 111 (1966); Mil-
ler v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965); Kirby v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co., 232 Cal. App.2d 9, 42 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1965); Grunfeld v. Pac. Auto. Ins.
Co., 232 Cal. App.2d 4, 42 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1965); Md. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Howe, 106
N.H. 422, 213 A.2d 420 (1965); Globe Ind. Co. v. Bakers Estate, 22 A.D.2d 658,
253 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1964).
132. Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 255 Iowa 69, 121 N.W.2d 500 (1963).
133. Id. at 75, N.W.2d 503.
134. LeBlanc v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 So.2d 791 (La. Ct. App. 1967), and
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caused by an automobile covered by a standard liability insurance
policy."'81 5 Since B could recover a total of $5,000, he was entitled to
receive only an additional $2,000 from his own carrier. The court pro-
fessed to follow the majority rule, but nevertheless reached a result
different from that which would have been obtained under a strict ap-
plication of the other insurance clause. Under the majority view, B would
probably have been precluded from any recovery against his own car-
rier, since the limit of coverage in his policy was identical to that of
A's policy, under which he had already received payment.
B. "Availability" of Other Insurance
The question of whether other similar insurance was "available"
to the insured was presented where the plaintiff-insured'8 6 was a pas-
senger in an automobile driven by another when struck by an uninsured
motorist. The driver was insured under a policy affording both liability
and uninsured motorist coverage. The driver's insurer settled with plain-
tiff under the liability coverage for $10,000, plaintiff executing a covenant
not to sue. Plaintiff then brought an action against his own uninsured
motorist carrier, contending that other similar insurance was not avail-
able. He argued that since the driver's insurer was permitted by the
policy terms to set off liability coverage payments against the uninsured
motorist coverage, and since the $10,000 already paid to plaintiff was
the limit of liability under the uninsured motorist coverage, the driver's
insurer was relieved of any liability to the plaintiff under its uninsured
motorist coverage. Therefore, he claimed that he was not foreclosed
from recovering under his own policy by the availability of "other similar
insurance." Plaintiff was successful-the court agreed that the settle-
ment under the driver's liability coverage rendered the uninsured motorist
coverage of the driver's policy "unavailable" to plaintiff. The term "avail-
able" was construed to mean, "actually available for the use of the
injured party."' 37
X. ENFORCEMENT OF UNINSURED MOTORIST CLAIMS
A. Methods of Enforcement
Ordinarily, three avenues are open to the insured for the enforce-
ment of an uninsured motorist claim. First, the insured may seek to
135. Courville v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., supra note 134 at 796, quot-
ing from 12 G. CoucH, INSURANCE, § 45:623 (2d ed. 1964).
136. Kraft v. Allstate Ins. Co., 6 Ariz. App. 276, 431 P.2d 917 (1967).
137. Id. at 279, 431 P.2d at 920.
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enforce his claim by arbitration; second, suit can be brought against
the uninsured motorist; and third, an action can be maintained directly
against the uninsured motorist insurance carrier. In the states where
the arbitration requirement 38 is not rendered unenforceable by statute 8 9
or decision,140 the insured generally must submit the issues of damages
and of legal liability of the uninsured motorist to arbitration.' 4 ' In
other states, including Missouri, the insured may look directly to the
courts for enforcement of his claim. The second alternative, bringing
suit against the uninsured motorist, is available to the insured except
in jurisdictions where the arbitration clause is binding.
A suit against the uninsured motorist has been held to be a con-
dition precedent to recovery or suit against the insurer in some juris-
dictions.'4 In other states, including Missouri, it is neither necessary
nor a condition precedent that the insured sue and obtain a judgment
against the uninsured motorist before maintaining an action against
138.
Provided, for the purposes of this coverage, determination as to whether
the insured or such representative is legally entitled to recover such dam-
ages, and if so the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between
the insured or such representative and the company or, if they fail to agree,
by arbitration. No judgement against any person or organization alleged
to be legally responsible for the bodily injury shall be conclusive, as be-
tween the insured and the company of the issues of liability of such per-
son or organization or of the amount of damages to which the insured is
legally entitled unless such judgment is entered pursuant to an action
prosecuted by the insured with the written consent of the company.
N. RisjoRa & J. AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 98, at 199.
139. See chart analysis at the end of this article.
140. Arkansas-Wortman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 227 F. Supp. 468 (E.D.
Ark. 1963), Statute; Georgia-Gulf Am. Fire & Cas. Co. v. McNeal, 115 Ga. App.
286, 154 S.E.2d 411 (1967); Illinois-Levy v. Am. Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Il1. App.2d
157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961); Louisiana-Macaluso v. Watson, 171 So.2d 755 (La.
Ct. App. 1965), Statute; Missouri-State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo. App. 1963); Hill v. Seaboard Fire and Marine
Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), Statute; Montana-Dominici v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 143 Mont. 406, 390 P.2d 806 (1964), Statute;
Oklahoma-Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960), Con-
trary to public policy; South Carolina-Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 455,
117 S.E.2d 867 (1961), Statute; Tennessee-Hickey III v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 239
F. Supp. 109 (E.D. Tenn. 1965); Utah-Barnhart v. Civil Service Employees Ins.
Co., 16 Utah 2d 223, 398 P.2d 873 (1965), Statute.
141. Kuvin, Arbitration Under Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 16 FED. OF INS.
COUNSEL Q. 30 (1965); Notman, A Decennial Study of Uninsured Motorist En-
dorsements, 540 INs. L.J. 22 (1968); Fieting, Arbitration under the Uninsured
Motorist Coverage, 28 INs. COUNSEL J. 629 (1961).
142. O'Brien v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 372 F.2d 335 (3rd Cir. 1967);
King v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 192, 160 S.E.2d 230 (1968).
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the insurer.143 In a direct action, the insured has the burden of proving:
(1) That the other motorist was uninsured, (2) that the other motorist
is legally liable to the insured, and (3) the amount of this liability. 144
A wide range of defenses, in addition to policy defenses, are available
to the insurer to defeat the insured's claim in a direct action. In estab-
lishing that the insured is not "legally entitled to recover" from the
uninsured motorist, the insurer may raise substantive defenses that
would have been available to the uninsured motorist.14 5
The written consent of the insurer must be requested to avoid
exclusion of coverage in a jurisdiction in which the judgment prohibition
has been upheld.140 This written consent should also be requested even
in jurisdictions where the judgment prohibition has been struck down,
in order to assure that a judgment obtained will be conclusive and
binding upon the insurer. Where the insurer is not a party to the action
against the uninsured motorist, but has notice of the pending action
and does nothing to protect its rights in that action, the question of
damages and of legal liability of the uninsured motorist may be conclu-
sively determined as between the insurer and the insured and may not
be relitigated.147
In Missouri and other jurisdictions it is now clear that an insurer
can protect itself from an adverse determination where the uninsured
motorist fails to defend, by intervening and defending on behalf of
the uninsured motorist.148 In State ex rel State Farm Insurance Company
v. Craig, the Springfield Court of Appeals emphasized that its holding
was limited to "the facts peculiar to the case," where the uninsured
motorist had totally refused to defend the action. Hence it is not clear
in Missouri whether intervention will be permitted where the uninsured
motorist defends, but the defense is not as vigorous or as complete as
143. State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1963); Wright v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 270 N.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 100 (1967).
144. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App.
1963); Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
145. See Traveler's Indem. Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1962); Aetna Cas. & Surety
Co. v. Mills, 192 So.2d 59 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
146. Andeen v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 70 Ill. App.2d 357, 217 N.E.2d 814(1966).
147. Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960).
148. State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Spr. Mo.
App. 1963); Kirouac v. Healey, 104 N.H. 157, 181 A.2d 634 (1962); Levy v. Am.
Auto. Ins. Co., 31 Il. App.2d 157, 175 N.E.2d 607 (1961); Continental Ins. Co. v.
Smith, 115 Ga. App. 667, 155 S.E.2d 713 (1967); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Glover, 113 Ga. App. 815, 149 S.E.2d 852 (1966).
[Vol. 34
34
Missouri Law eview, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/8
UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
the insurance company would desire. It is suggested that intervention
in such cases should be permitted. The suit would not be complicated by
the injection of new issues into the suit since policy defenses would
have to be raised in a declaratory judgment action or in a subsequent
suit by the insured against the insurer. 49 One problem which is raised
by intervention, however, is that of the conflict of interest between the
insurer and the insured. °50 This conflict becomes acute when the unin-
sured motorist asserts a counterclaim against the insured for negligence,
where the insurer has also provided the insured with liability coverage.
The insurer owes its insured a defense under the liability coverage,
but a vigorous defense establishing that the uninsured motorist was
solely negligent would establish an element of the insured's case for
recovery under his uninsured motorist coverage. Except in comparative
negligence jurisdictions, only a finding that the insured and uninsured
motorist were jointly culpable would avoid insurer's liability on one
coverage or the other. Many of these problems can be avoided in
Missouri and other jurisdictions, where suit may be brought directly
against the insurer on the uninsured motorist coverage.
B. Limitations Period-Contract or Tort?
The uninsured motorist coverage does not state a period of time
within which claims must be presented. The question of which statute
of limitations applies to actions maintained under this coverage remains
unsettled in most jurisdictions. Arguments advanced for the application
of the tort statute of limitations center around three primary conten-
tions: First, the insured's claim for injury derives from the tortious
acts of the uninsured motorist and possesses the character of an action
ex delicto; second, application of the contract statute of limitations
could extinguish the insurer's subrogation rights against the uninsured
motorist; and, third, upon expiration of the tort statute of limitations,
which is substantially shorter than the contract statute of limitations in
most jurisdictions, the insured is no longer "legally entitled to recover"
from the uninsured motorist and therefore cannot maintain a claim against
149. See Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1963).
150. United Services Auto. Ass'n. v. Logue, (Ga. 1968) (Unreported at date of
publication). One court refused to countenance the situation. Holt v. Bell, 392
P.2d 361 (Okla. 1964).
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the insurer. 51 A Missouri holding 52 that the nature of the action
-against the uninsured motorist carrier is contractual, and subsequent
dictum in another case, 53 indicates that the statute of limitations for
contract actions may be controlling in Missouri. Such a holding would
be unfortunate from the point of view of the insurance company and
would constitute a modification of the intended nature of the coverage.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, in holding that the six year contract
statute of limitations, rather than the one year tort statute, applied
to an insured's remedy for injuries sustained in an accident with a
hit-and-run motorist, expressly noted that the identity of the hit-and-run
driver was not known or ascertainable and that the insurer had no
"subrogation right that could have been prejudiced by the application
of the contract statute of limitations.'6 4 Where such rights do exist
and where the uninsured motorist's identity is known, suit against
the insurer after the tort statute of limitations has run would in effect
make the insurance company the liability insurer of the uninsured motorist
by cutting off all recourse by the insurer against the uninsured motorist.
This situation could foster collusion between the uninsured motorist
and the insured in that the insured could delay maintaining his claim
until after the tort statute of limitations had run. This would bar any
recourse against the uninsured motorist for his negligence, since the
tort statute of limitations would bar the claim against the uninsured
motorist.
It is argued in support of the application of the tort statute of
limitations that the insured is not "legally entitled to recover" damages
from the uninsured motorist after the tort statute of limitations has
run. This raises the question of whether the insured need only have a
151. Pretzel, Uninsured Motorist: Uneasy Money-Unless Modified, INS. LAW J.
719 (1965); Kuvin, The Effect on Uninsured Motorist Proceedings of Statute of
Limitations; Survival Of Actions Act; Wrongful Death Act; Subrogation Rights,
29 INs. COUNSEL J. 127 (1962).
152. Hill v. Seaboard Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 374 S.W.2d 606 (K.C. Mo. App.
1963). Referring to an action by the insured directly against the insurer, the court
stated: "Nor is such suit a tort action merely because the insured under the terms
of the contract sued or must show he is entitled to recover damages from the owner
or operator of an uninsured automobile.' Id. at 611.
153. In Noland v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 413 S.W.2d 530 (K.C. Mo. App.
1967), the same court referred to the Hill case: "We also held that the action was
upon contract (not tort) and that the terms of the contract governed." Id. at 533.
For the contrary position that the action is ex delicto rather than contractual, see
Fremin v. Collins, 194 So.2d 470 (La. Ct. App. 1967).
154. Schleif v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 218 Tenn. 489, 495, 404
S.W.2d 490, 493 (1966).
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cause of action against the uninsured motorist, or whether the insured's
claim must be enforceable. This question has not been firmly resolved
by the few cases in this area.15 5 Application of the tort statute of limita-
tions, however, is consistent with the objective of uninsured motorist
coverage of placing the insured in the same position as he would have
been had the adverse motorist been insured. If the insured's claim against
the tort-feasor is not enforceable, he is not "legally entitled to recover"
damages from the tort-feasor, and should not be allowed recovery under
his uninsured motorist coverage.
XI. CONCLUSION
Generally, it is clear that uninsured motorist coverage has been a
great aid in providing protection against the risk of injury through the
negligence of a financially irresponsible motorist. There are, however,
many problems related to the application of the coverage for which no
satisfactory answer has yet been found. In this regard, it is suggested
that the courts should keep in mind the purpose of the coverage when
deciding the existence and extent of the coverage afforded a claimant
in any given case. In some instances, the decisions have excluded coverage
by an overly strict construction of the language of the policy, while in
other cases the courts have gone too far in determining the extent of
protection that was intended to be afforded by the coverage.
Uninsured motorist coverage is a relatively new creature to the
law, and there are many additional problems for which the solution
is not clear simply because there has not been sufficient litigation to
produce a thorough examination of the issues and of the relevant policy
considerations. It is hoped that this article has contributed something
to the isolation and examination of these issues so that an understand-
ing of the most desirable and practical formula for the operation of
this coverage can be achieved.
155. Fireman's Ins. Co. v. Diskin, 255 Cal. App.2d 502, 63 Cal. Rptr. 177(1968). Claim against insurer precluded by insured's failure to bring action against
uninsured motorist or insurer within one year tort statute of limitation. See also
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bell, 213 Cal. App.2d 541, 29 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1963); and,
Booth v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 197 So.2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1967), which held
action against insurer ex contractu.
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APPENDIX
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